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The Vietnam War:

Tax Costs and True Costs

By Peter B. Lund
The Common Man in the Street, on being interviewed and
asked the question, "What is the cost of the Vietnam War?,"
might respond, "I understand it's about twenty-five billion
dollars a year."
Twenty-five billion dollars per year is the
current estimate of the tax cost of the Vietnam War and a
figure which is widely circulated in this country. However,
one need not be an especially astute observer of the domestic
and international effects of the Vietnam situation as it
affects this country domestically and internationally to
realize that the cost to the United States of conducting a
war of the size and sort which rages now in Southeast Asia
greatly exceeds the nominal dollar sum which is borne by the
nation's taxpayers. Consequently, one would expect, or at
least hope, that our Common Man would append to this response
some qualifications such as, "But that twenty-five billion
dollars doesn't include the trouble we have here at home with
the peaceniks and the ruckus and fuss kicked up around the
world and aimed at our embassies and maybe a few other things
which a guy can't really put his finger on."
I would like to put a finger on those "other things"
which are implied by the Vietnam War and which should be
included in a comprehensive measure of the true costs to
the American people of the Vietnam War, but which are not
counted in the calculations of the Bureau of the Budget and
the Department of Defense. As an incidental exercise, not
unrelated to the task of pinning down elements of the cost
of the War, I would like to delve briefly into the question
of how the cost is distributed among the citizens of this
country. Whether or not our Common Man can readily and
exactly identify the costs associated with the War, he
and his fellows bear them all. However, depending on just
who he is, he may bear a heavy cost burden or a light one.
The uncommonly heavily burdened Common Man, in particular,
has an uncommon interest in learning of his situation. Those
who are most directly concerned with determining how the
costs are distributed should also have an interest. At
least, all Common Men would hope they do. It will
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facilitate matters to divide true costs into three categories and to discuss each separately:
(1) Direct
resource costs, (2) intangible and indirect costs, and
(3) Net foregone benefits. What is included in each
category will become clear as each is discussed.
Direct Resource Costs
The conduct of the Vietnam War requires the use of
an endless variety and immense quantity of tangible
physical resources. At any point in time more than half
a million United States military men are in Vietnam
devoting their efforts directly to the conduct of the war.
Thousands more pursue the war effort at locations more or
less remote from Vietnam itself: Thailand, the Phillipines,
Hawaii, San Francisco, Washington, D.C. Countless tons of
steel and millions of yards of cloth are expended annually
in the war effort. A full listing of resources would
comprise several pages of fine print.
According to federal government estimates the budgetary costs of all the resources amounts to approximately
twenty-five billion dollars per year, currently. If we
ignore such intractable accounting problems as those involved in dividing the costs of the San Francisco Hunter's
Point Naval Shipyards between the Vietnam War and other
defense efforts or the salary of the Secretary of Defense
into discrete portions, one of which is allocated to the
War, and if we further ignore the liklihood that some of
these sorts of calculations are not even made by the
budgetary cost estimators, we may agree with the Administration in Washington that taxpayers are coming up with
approximately twenty-five billion dollars per year to
sponsor the direct use of resources in the War effort.
However, we will not agree with the Administration,
our common men, or with anyone else that twenty-five
billion dollars represents the full direct resource costs
bf the War. Such costs are meaningfully measured by the
dollar value of the resources in their alternative uses,
the true value of the resources to the United States, not
by nominal dollars which our government pays for them.
The measure- of value in alternative use is simply the
market price of a resource times the quantity involved.
If the government buys one million single-edged razor blades
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and pays the going market price for them, then the budget
cost figure for single-edged razor blades satisfactorily
represents the resource cost involved. The question is,
does the government buy resources for the Vietnam War at
market prices? For most resources it does, but for at
least one very vital and, in dollar terms, very significant resource, it does not. Were he twenty-two years of
age and just completing his college education in the spring
of 1968, our Common Man could readily identify the resources
involved, namely himself and the other draft-eligible men
of this country.
The way in which the manpower resource costs of a
draft army as reflected in the federal budget deviate
from the value of the manpower resources in their alternative employment is an issue which has received modest attention over the years. In an excellent article published in the
August, 1967, issue of the Quarterly Journal of Economics and
entitled, "Economics of the Military Draft," Professors
Weisbrod and Hansen of the University of Wisconsin provide
some enlightening empirical observations on the subject.
On the basis of certain reasonable simplifying assumptions
and using 1959 income data and 1963 manpower data, Weisbrod
and Hansen calculate that the average annual salary income
which would have been received by military men who are draftaffected (most simply, draftees or those whose "voluntary"
service was compelled by the threat of the draft) amounts to
about $3900. Average annual compensation for draft-affected
military men, including fringe benefits such as housing,
food, and so forth, is approximately $2400. The discrepancy,
then between the budget cost and the actual resource cost is
$1500 per man.
Exactly how many men involved in the Vietnam War effort
are draft-affected is not known, but one can get an idea of
the possible magnitude of the budget's understatement of
resource costs by performing some simple multiplications.
There are in excess of one-half million men involved in the
War. If half of them are draft-affected, the understatement
is $375 million, or 1.5% of the total budget cost. If 400,000
men are draft-affected the understatement is $600 million, or
almost 2.5% of the War cost. Considering that Weisbrod and
Hansen view their estimates as conservative and considering
further that military pay raises over the past few years have
not kept pace with increases in civilian salaries, the actual
understatement of the War costs is probably considerably
greater than the above figures indicate.
-
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There is a possible futther understatement of the
direct resource costs of the War. For the period January 1,
1961, through the first week of March, 1968, United States
casualties in Vietnam included 19,313 dead and 117,680
wounded. At current rates, the casualty toll in Vietnam
exceeds 10,000 dead and 50,000 wounded annually. What
exactly are the resource costs of war casualties and are
they included in the federal budget cost estimate?
Consider the matter of war deaths. To put it in terms
necessarily dispassionate and objective, in the case of a
soldier's death society loses a substantial investment in a
productive resource. An educated and trained human represents
an investment which potentially will yield an amount of produce in the future. In principle, destruction of human beings
who have training and education is no different in terms of
loss of future material product than in the destruction of a
machine. Estimates of the value of the productive capital
represented by a trained and educated human are unavoidably
somewhat speculative, but figures have been developed. Professor Becker of the University of Chicago, in a path-breaking
work on the subject entitled Human Capital: A Theoretical and
Empirical Analysis with Special Reference to Education, has
developed estimates which can be-combined with Vietnam death
figures to provide an indication of the War's destruction of
human capital. Becker estimates that a male, age twenty-two
and with a high school education, represents $33,000 in productive capital. If it is reasonable to assume that in
Vietnam we are losing annually 10,000 men whose average age
is twenty-two and whose education is at the high school level,
then our country loses annually $330"million worth of human
capital.
Whether or not this represents an additional direct
resource cost which is not included in the twenty-five billion
dollar budget figure depends on two considerations. One is
whether or not the military death benefits paid the survivors
of War dead are equal to the value of the capital lost. The
second is whether the budget cost estimate includes death
benefits.
Similar considerations apply to wounded soldiers. Depending on the nature of the injuries involved, destruction of a
certain amount of human capital takes place when soldiers are
wounded. Speculation on what dollar quantities are involved
is not particularly fruitful, but it may fairly be concluded
that a substantial loss occurs. Again, questions may be
raised as to whether injury benefits equal to the capital loss
are paid and whether such benefits are included in the budget
figure.
-
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In summary, our
that the full direct
the quoted budgetary
is probably at least
maximum, may be four

Common Man is well-advised to consider
resource costs of the Vietnam War exceed
costs by an amount which, at a minimum,
2% of the budget figure but which, at a
or five times as high.

Intangible and Indirect Costs
Unless our Common Man is uncommonly ignorant of what goes
on in his country and elsewhere, he will be aware that not only
are a great many tangible physical resources used up in the
prosecution of the Vietnam War, but that a substantial number
of other negative consequences of the War burden his and his
fellows' existence. He will also be aware that these burdens
are nowhere reflected in the budget estimate. The emotional
suffering which a mother and father expeiience when their son
is reported killed in action is not a material thing which can
be measured in dollars and cents. The expenditure of human
emotion in war-associated grief does not represent the exhaustion of a tangible resource valuable to the production of
cigars, TV sets, or breakfast foods. However, that it is
costly in terms of its effects on human well-being is undeniable. That it should be regarded as a cost of the Vietnam
War is also clear.
Parental grief over the loss of a son is but one of the
intangible and indirect costs which may be imputed to the prosecution of the war in Southeast Asia. Were our Common Man a
close observer of foreign peoples and their attitudes toward
the United States he would be able to tell us of the loss of
international stature and position which his country has
experienced as a result of the War effort. Were he a member
of the Oakland Police Department he could describe the effort
he and his fellow officers have spent in controlling anit-War
demonstrations in the streets of that city. Were he an expert
on resource use in the judicial process he could tell us what
amount of resources has been devoted to the resolution of
legal entanglements arising from citizen War protest.
It is clear that the measurement of such costs in terms
which are useful in the making of decisions regarding the War
effort is an exceedingly difficult proposition. In some
instances the attempt would be simply impossible. However,
it is equally clear that the existence of such costs cannot
be ignored merely because they are not readily susceptible
to measurement. Any decision on the War must take account
of them in some way, because they are undeniably substantial.
-
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Net Foregone Benefits
The Common Man often hears that the cost of our Vietnam
involvement includes such things as the following: urban
riots, racial strife in general, the weakening of the U. S.
military posture in Korea and elsewhere, upward pressure on
the dollar price of gold, and other various and sundry items.
I would suggest that to relate these problems to the Vietnam
War on a simple cost basis is incorrect. I would hasten to
add, however, that the War and some of the crises which afflict
our country are not unrelated and that the relationship should
be viewed as follows.
Our commitment of resources to Vietnam entails the cost of
the resources and certain intangible and indirect cost consequences as described above. In addition, as a result of the
War effort there are, in principle at least, certain benefits
created. The commitment of the same resources to alternative
programs, whether public or private, domestic or international,
would entail the same direct resource costs, would pos~ibly
give rise to tangible and indirect costs, and would presumably
provide benefits. Consider the following alternative to the
Vietnam War. The President's National Advisory Commission on
Civil Disorders suggests that a program for solving problems
of urban riots in this country would cost approximately two
billion dollars per month. Let us assume that the direct
resource costs involved in the expenditure of this two billion
dollars per month on an "Urban War" just equal those involved
in the Vietnam War. Let us assume, further, that some intangible and indirect costs would be associated with the Urban
War. Certain individuals might suffer grief at having their
personal freedom impinged upon by increasing federal government involvement in the urban area. Protest movements
concerning the Urban War might require police and judicial
action. An4 finally, let us assume that the Urban War would
produce some benefits.
Compare, now, the two alternatives, the Vietnam War and
the Urban War. If the total benefits of the Vietnam War minus
its costs (direct resource costs plus tangible and indirect
costs) fall short of the total benefits of the Urban War minus
its costs, then we may conclude that the country has been disadvantaged by the decision to pursue the Vietnam War rather
than the Urban War. In this sense one may attribute domestic
crises to the pursuit of the Vietnam War.
Again, because it is imperative that decision-makers be
possessed of complete information, we are faced with the
question of evaluating this additional sort of cost in a way
-
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which is meaningful and useful. The problem of cost measurement in this case is well-nigh insuperable, however, because
what must be attempted is not only the evaluation of direct
resource costs, intangible costs, and indirect costs, but also
the evaluation of benefits. One can only say that the
evaluation of benefits is a contentious matter of the highest
order. What may a public decision-maker conclude when he
hears on the one hand from the Common Bearded Hippie in the
Street that the benefits created by the Vietnam War are equal
to zero and on the other from the Common John Bircher in the
Street that the value of prosecuting the War is surpassed not
even by life itself? Despite the dilemma, though, it is clear
that significant net benefits may be foregone as a result of
pursuing the war in Vietnam and that decision-makers must do
no less than their best in trying to determine if this is so.
Cost Distribution Considerations
I would like to consider one final sort of cost which is
often improperly imputed to the War. The total cost of the
War is distributed in some fashion among the citizens of this
country. Many observers, making their best estimates of that
cost distribution, conclude that it is a distinctly inequitable
distribution. The major contention is that those individuals
who are most directly involved in conducting the war, the
soldiers on the firing lines in Vietnam, along with their
families, bear an unusually and inequitably large share of the
War's cost.
Given the highly intangible nature of many of the costs
which rest on such persons, a close estimate of the differential
cost burden on them is difficult to make. There is, however,
some empirical evidence relating to a part of the differential
burden. We have seen that a significant extra-budgetary cost
appears because military pay rates are substantially less in
many cases than alternative civilian rates. It is clear that
this cost rests squarely on the draft-affected soldiers whose
military salaries fall short of their civilian alternatives.
As indicated above, the amount by which the average military
compensation for draft-affected men fell short of their
average alternative civilian salary was $1500. In effect,
the military draft causes an implicit tax of $1500 per man to
be levied on substantial numbers of our nation's military men.
Such a tax clearly is inequitable. Were a tax of similar
magnitude placed on another minority group in our society to
finance some other public endeavor, such as the building of
-
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the spaceport at Cape Kennedy, the outcry from both the minority
and the majority would be immediate and loud. This is because
our society in the United States has long been more or less
firmly committed to the general principle of equity. For a
society which views equity as a virtue, the sacrifice of equity
is a cost. It is incorrect, however, to attribute the loss of
equity in the distribution of Vietnam War costs to the War
itself. The differential tax placed on draft-affected soldiers
who are involved in the Vietnam War effort is due, not to the
War, but to the institution of compulsory military service. The
same may be said for all the other War costs which may or may
not be distributed in an equitable fashion. The War gives rise
to the costs, but our society's institutional structure gives
rise to the pattern of distribution. However, it should be
noted that given the institutions which might lead to an inequitable distribution of war costs, the inequity need never
arise if wars never are fought. If we are rid of the Vietnam
War, we are rid of the inequitable cost distribution.
Conclusion
It would be erroneous to conclude from the preceding discussion that our Common Man is now armed with sufficient
guiding principles, concepts and data to march on Washington
to inform the decision-makers in the Pentagon, the State Department and the White House what the true costs of the Vietnam War
amount to. Rather, the lesson is that in considering the costs
of the Vietnam War one must realize that some aspects of the
War situation represent War costs and others do not; some cost
elements may objectively be agreed upon regarding their
quantitative significance and others require subjective valuation; and considerable thought and effort must be devoted to
the question of War costs before a rational and enlightened
estimate can be made. Unless the people of this country are
willing and able to devote such thought and effort, we cannot
be sure that the democratic processes which they have agreed
upon as regulators of their common business will produce an
appropriate decision with respect to the continuance of the
war in Southeast Asia. I would suggest that the potential cost
of improper decision-making on this country's conduct of international war is sufficiently great that no citizen can afford
not to dwell seriously and at length on the subject of this
essay.
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